JPRS-USA-90-012
23 November 1990

JPRS Report



Soviet Union

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 8, August 1990

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[The following are translations of selected articles in the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology

No 8, August 1990

Teamwork With U.S. Key to Local Conflicts

91UF0001A Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to press 26 Jul 90) pp 3-11

[Article by Prof Viktor Aleksandrovich Kremenyuk, doctor of historical sciences, deputy director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Settlement of Regional Conflicts: Outlines of a General Approach"]

[Text] Settlement of a number of regional conflicts has entered the stage of practical realization. Agreements have been reached by the great powers and direct participants in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Southwest Africa. Ways of achieving compromise in the Cambodian situation have been identified, and prospects for a settlement in Ethiopia are under discussion. A truce is in effect between Iran and Iraq. Intensive searches for peace are underway in the Near East. Improvements have even been seen in the old conflict between North and South Korea. In short, the situation with respect to many regional conflicts is developing (although at varying rates) towards seeking peaceful resolution to the problem.

But it is not yet time to celebrate. The settlement of regional conflicts is a complex, multifarious, and extremely delicate matter, and one should not expect quick successes. It is not enough to declare a policy of regulation and national reconciliation. We must go beyond this and find a way to remove the numerous layers of mistrust and suspicion. We must understand the substance of the positions taken by the parties, delve into the underlying cause of one series of actions or another leading to enmity and irreconcilability. We must also determine a model of reconciliation—which cannot be universal, of course—and develop a reliable technology for implementing the decisions which are made. All of these things are today taken up by diplomacy, although perhaps not as successfully as we might like.

Conflict Theory

One of the particular aspects of forming a new view in Soviet diplomacy of the regulation of regional conflicts was the fact that, unlike in other countries, it was not preceded by a more or less lengthy period of discussion in the press and scientific circles of the general theoretical and practical approaches, of the juxtaposition of various points of view. There have been discussions on this topic, of course. And individual works have been published—the editions of Ye.M. Primakov, V.V. Zhurkin, and V.I. Gantman. But regardless of their indisputable usefulness, they failed to create the necessary base to supply practical experience with a spectrum of alternatives, with non-traditional approaches to conflict settlement. In order to more precisely understand what we are dealing with here, we may cite the example of the United States—there such issues were being studied intensively back in the '60s, at the Center for Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor), and then at Harvard University. Today a prominent place in this sphere is occupied by the Carter Center at Emory University, the School of International Research at Johns Hopkins University, the Program for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Syracuse University, and many others.

One aspect of the positive influence of science on the diplomatic process is the thorough and fundamental training scholars acquire in a rather narrow field of specialization, knowing the specifics and problems of one region or another and having the ability to apply theoretical models to a specific situation. Many practitioners have either participated directly in such elaborations or studied them at universities. Upon completing their studies, therefore, they entered service in the State Department and other government departments. It was only natural for them to borrow familiar ideas and try to use the knowledge they had obtained in regulating a certain conflict. Similar processes take place, although on a different scale, in Great Britain, France, the FRG, and Japan.

Practical experience is thus enriched by the results of scholars' academic reflections, and scientific research—by the results of practical experience. And this is not a closed loop of the same ideas reproduced over and over again, but rather a mutual enrichment and engendering of new concepts and recommendations on this basis. After intensive discussion in the academic environment (sometimes with the participation of representatives of government institutions), they go to departments, to committees and subcommittees of the Congress, to individual congressmen, and to the mass media. A singular kind of control by the press over the fate of these recommendations has often had a decisive influence on their success.

Soviet specialists were deprived over a long period of time of the opportunity to interact thus with the press, and their recommendations, directed to government and party organs, often went unanswered. The environment of secrecy grew thicker particularly when such delicate matters arose as USSR participation in one conflict or another.

General conflict theory consists of various schools and trends. Among these are theories which have been repeatedly severely criticized in the press, for example the "zero-sum" conflict theory, which denies on principle the possibility of coexistence with enemies and dooms them to "eternal conflict." But there are also theories of significantly greater interest which have often been refuted at the outset by Soviet science simply because it was not we who proposed them. [1] These are theories based on "zero-sum" games, or "rivalry-cooperation" theories, which on the whole have fairly objectively described the confrontation in the world

arena between two fundamental systems as well as internal contradictions between hostile groups in individual countries.

In the early stages of development of these theories, at the end of the '50s and beginning of the '60s, the works of prominent American political expert T. Schelling were dominated by an extremely practical orientation. The chief task was declared to be development of a strategy of optimal gain, which did not preclude the coexistence of enemies (and therefore the presence of interest common to them), but emphasis was placed all the same on the attainment of unilateral victory. In spite of the indisputable logic of such a posturing of the question (since there is a conflict, one must strive to emerge victorious from it), the adherents of such theories gave practically no serious consideration to another aspect of confrontation of the "rivalry-cooperation" variety, namely—what line, what strategy should the sides pursue if a unilateral victory is impossible? For example, regarding a war with the employment of nuclear weapons—insofar as victory here has become impossible, the hypothetical participants would appear to share a common interest, consisting of avoidance of the conflict itself.

When such a situation actually came about in relations between the United States and the USSR, and the 1962 crisis in the Caribbean uncovered a clear, mutual desire to avoid nuclear war, various prescriptions appeared. The "escalation theory" of G. Kahn proposed "intimidation" of the other side, threatening to shift to "unthinkable" stages of confrontation. The "crisis management" theory (A. George, R. Smoak, L. Bloomfield) was oriented on the possibility of developing "game rules" which would limit the degree of danger of conflicts without eliminating them. Then T. Schelling's approach to regional conflicts was formulated—if the strategic situation in a "central" conflict makes victory unattainable, the center of gravity should be shifted to local and regional conflicts. [2] Only later on, when the U.S. military intervention in Indochina met with defeat and when the USSR was forced to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan without achieving the desired result, did the concept emerge that there are very powerful restraining principles at work in regional conflicts as well, which make military victory by one side practically impossible.

The interest of politicians and the public could not help but focus on other theories as well, which showed strong elements of reason and humaneness from the very beginning. One of the most promising directions of this kind of research was seen in the theory whose main proponents can rightly be considered A. Rappaport, K. Boulding, and D. Zinger.

Theory of Conflict Settlement

This concept, in its original form, was oriented mainly on the possibility of providing a typology for conflicts. On the one hand, this would decrease the danger of one turning into the beginning of a general war and, on the other, would identify those among them most prone to settlement, or some kind of limitation at least. A. Rappaport devised the following classifications: "skirmishes," "debates," and "games." "Skirmishes" preclude coexistence; their struggle continues until the end. As an example, we can point to that sphere of ideology where compromise is clearly impossible in principle. Relegated to the category of "debates" were less structured conflicts, in which a bitter struggle to achieve victory (not at any price, however) can be combined with the observance of rules of one sort or another. Rivalry between the United States and USSR in the "Third World," for example, belongs to this category, which only once—in 1962 during the Caribbean crisis—threatened to rise to the level of a nuclear missile confrontation. In all remaining instances, the sides observed unwritten rules so as to preclude escalating the confrontation to a direct clash between their armed forces. Finally, a conflict of the "games" variety is distinguished by a precise system of rules which demand strict observance. For rivalry in the sphere of nuclear missile confrontation, for example, both sides have always strictly observed certain rules of conduct, understanding the weightiness of the consequences of their violations. [3]

Applying this view to conflicts, naturally, the "games" appear in the foreground in the scheme of settlement, since the existence of rules—recorded or simply understood—serves right away as a point of departure in seeking means of resolution. A chain of logical reasoning led Rappaport to the conclusion that the arms race as a type of conflict—primarily the nuclear missile arms race—could become one of the first areas in which attempts should be made at reaching a settlement. Such ideas were under active discussion in the USSR, the United States, and the United Nations as long ago as the 1960s, and following the Soviet-American meeting in Glassboro (United States) in 1967 they rose to the level of practical negotiations.

With respect to the second type of conflict, the "debates," matters are not so simple. Regional conflicts, seeming to fall by their nature into the "debates" category, turn out in fact to be significantly more complicated. From the point of view of the USSR and United States, they present a specific variety of conflict in which definite limiting factors are involved (what were later referred to in American literature as "unwritten rules") [4] and simultaneously a certain freedom of action. From the point of view of the direct participants, the conflict is a significantly more complex phenomenon. It may include ideological (including denominational), racial, ethnic, and many other components—which often make it a "zero-sum game," in which the gain of one side is equivalent to the loss of the other. This aspect for a long time escaped the view of theoreticians (probably because the conviction was too strong that any regional conflict was primarily the consequence of outside intervention) and provided them no opportunity to approach the development of a more or less adequate model of conflict settlement.

Soviet science, it must be admitted, was guilty of the same sin. The dominating point of view in works on international conflicts appearing in the '70s was that the factor of outside intervention (on the part of the United States, Great Britain, France, and other developed capitalist countries) played a definite role in the emergence and exacerbation of regional conflicts. This point of view was to a great extent bolstered by statistics, which showed that more than 80 percent constituted conflicts involving the participation of Western powers. [5] The statistics played a mean trick on researchers in this process, however, because the overwhelming majority of all cases beginning in 1945 belonged to the period of wars for national independence (Indochina, Algeria, Kenya, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, etc.), and when the former colonies gained political independence this relatively simple type of conflict began to disappear, with certain important exceptions (the U.S. war in Vietnam). On the other hand, the role of another type of conflict increased—border, ethnic, and religious conflict, forming the basis of what we now refer to as regional conflicts.

The intensified "multi-layered" political aspect of conflicts was simply not taken into account at first. No matter what the actual sources were, they were all squeezed into the system of global confrontation as recurring platforms for confrontation and, in the words of famous Soviet researcher D.G. Tomashevskiy, began to play a definite role in the world correlation of forces. [6] And here we see the belief that conflict regulation is not so much a question of domestic and foreign policy of the countries directly participating in it as much as it is a question of agreement between the great powers. Proceeding from this, for example, an agreement was reached on convening the Geneva Peace Conference on the Near East (1973/74). The utter failure of the conference, however, for some reason did not prompt any desire to reconsider the belief itself. Conference participants were occupied more with the search for guilty parties (H. Kissinger, for example), while saying nothing about the true cause of the failure—defects in the approach itself.

Difficulties in settling conflicts in the 1970s are explained not only by the fact that they were incorrectly viewed as the consequence of outside intervention, but also by the clear contradiction between the efforts of the USSR and United States toward negotiations and agreements in the sphere of limiting strategic arms, and their intransigence in the sphere of regional conflicts. Guided by the thesis of exacerbating ideological conflict as the easing of world tension progressed, Soviet foreign policy substantially intensified its actions in the "Third World": treaties on friendship and cooperation were concluded with India, Iraq, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Mozambique, Egypt, and many other countries. The Soviet Union provided a great deal of military assistance to Angola, Syria, Libya, and Ethiopia. Finally, in December 1979, Soviet forces moved into Afghanistan. The United States, although trying to restrict its direct interference in conflicts at the beginning of the 1970s (as a consequence of its defeat in Vietnam), nonetheless continued to play an active role in regional clashes as a supplier of arms, diplomatic patron, and sometimes even as an initiator of actions in violation of international peace and security. Against such a background there could not be any serious discussion on settlement of regional conflicts, and in fact none took place.

Soviet-American Consultations

The great powers—both as permanent members of the UN Security Council and as countries with an extensive system of alliances and other friendly ties—bear responsibility, of course, for the presence and state of regional conflicts. While emphasizing to the fullest extent the significance of local factors in their development, one cannot at the same time present the matter as if the great powers have nothing to do with the development of a situation in one region or another. They supply arms to their friends and allies, train their forces, provide them economic and technological assistance, and afford them diplomatic support. In a number of cases, although not all by far, decisions are made not without their prompting which lead to an exacerbation or, on the contrary, to an easing of confrontation. In short, with all due respect to the sovereignty of parties in conflict, it is the great powers which are the real, although not the direct, participants in such clashes, and this fact must be reckoned with.

The USSR and United States were divided on this issue by a stone wall of mutual suspicion and rivalry for many long years. Although there were examples in the past where they worked jointly in certain crises (the Geneva Conference of 1954 which put an end to the bloodshed in Korea and Indochina; the 1961/62 conference on Laos), established practice all the same precluded the possibility of fruitful dialogue. Even during the Vietnam War years, and especially during that stage when the United States had already decided to remove its troops from the country, there was no coherent discussion on settling the conflict during the Soviet-American summit meeting in May 1972. In any case, this is what H. Kissinger asserts in his memoirs. [7]

The abnormality of this situation became strikingly apparent in the 1970s. Attempts by the Carter administration to eliminate this in its own way, using the "linkage" method in Soviet-American negotiations on strategic arms limitations, were not successful. The "linkage" method involved a great deal that was farfetched—chiefly the fact that it could be used as a means of applying pressure on the Soviet Union, which of course did not facilitate development of normal dialogue on regional problems. On the contrary, this delayed any progress in the negotiations themselves. The brief period 1977-1978, when the USSR and the United States attempted to conduct negotiations on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, on the Near East (even signing a joint declaration), and on conventional weapons deliveries,

left no noticeable mark on interaction between them. One might even say that, in raising unjustified expectations, it only hindered future progress in effecting a productive exchange of views and interfered with the building of confidence.

Nonetheless, even in the 1980s, when a crisis had broken out in Soviet-American relations in connection with the events in Afghanistan, necessity forced both sides to work towards effecting an exchange of views on regional problems. The first round of such exchanges took place in 1981-1982 between A.A. Gromyko and then U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig, without success. But its significance should not be underestimated, insofar as it was a breakthrough in an area of confrontation enabling at least the general outlines of dialogue to appear regarding the interests of the sides in regional conflicts. These discussions had far-reaching consequences since, prior to this, each side simply refused to recognize the interests of the other in one region or another of the globe and insisted on the "legitimacy" of its own interests. The raising of the issue enabled progress towards such a productive concept as the "balance of interests," although it was long after 1985 that this came about.

Generally speaking, it would be unrealistic to refer to some kind of "system" of Soviet-American consultations on regional issues prior to 1985. During this stage, interaction between the USSR and the United States remained a conflict of the "debate" variety, if we return to the Rappaport terminology, but was focused on confrontation, even if accompanied by a number of written and unwritten rules (1963 Memorandum on Establishment of the Direct Communications Link, 1972 Agreements on the Avoidance of Incidents on the Open Sea and Over Its Airspace and Measures to Improve the Direct Communications Link, 1972 Agreement on Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and United States, etc.). Under these conditions sporadic meetings and discussions could only somewhat assuage the contradictions and prevent them from being exacerbated to the extreme. They could not untangle them.

The intolerable nature of this situation became particularly apparent in the fall of 1985, on the eve of the first meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and President Reagan (Geneva, November 1985). The American President delivered a speech on regional conflicts in the United Nations on 24 October 1985, which became the prologue to pronouncement of the "Reagan doctrine." This speech again presented the theme of outside interference as the fundamental principle of conflicts, the thesis that they can be terminated only through a struggle against the "foreign ideology" forcibly thrust on the countries of the "Third World."[8] It must be acknowledged that the President's speech contained certain constructive ideas, in particular concerning phased conflict settlement (dialogue between conflict participants, Soviet-American negotiations, participation of the world community), but the address itself was ideologized to the point where it could evoke only a negative reaction in response.

A positive development was the fact that from this time onward regional conflicts fell under the scope of questions to be discussed periodically at Soviet-American meetings. Experts from both countries conducted negotiations on the official and unofficial level. Serious efforts began towards achieving a settlement in Afghanistan, culminating in April 1988 with the signing of an agreement. Soviet and American officials started to discuss the situation in Southwest Africa. On the whole, a unified system of consultations began to take shape.

By this time a new level of theoretical concepts had formed in the United States. R. Axelrod, professor at the University of Michigan and member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, made up his mind to expose the uncertainty of Schelling's theoretical computations, which over a long time had come to dominate official and academic thought. He took into account the fact that Schelling's work was oriented on the stereotyped thinking of the '50s, according to which conflict between the USSR and the United States would develop on the ascent until it reached a culmination, resulting in nuclear war. In principle, the theory of conflict developed a strategy of U.S. conduct which would afford it the advantage in a "final" clash (our thinking was developed along approximately the same lines—"This is our final, decisive battle"). However, Schelling's theory overlooked the fact that nuclear missiles had appeared on both sides and, along with them, the situation of mutual assured destruction.

Axelrod proceeded from the premise that conflict in Soviet- American relations under conditions when nuclear war was becoming unthinkable (and this was officially acknowledged and stated in the joint declaration of M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in November 1985) could not be of a one-time nature but would develop within a chain of minor conflicts, including regional ones, where both sides would strive to gain the upper hand, each time taking into account the results of the preceding stage. Axelrod assigned a quantitative value to the presumed events of such a conflict and calculated the possible overall results on a computer. The outcome was unambiguous: The most solid and optimal gain for the sides was produced when each of them, presented at all stages of the confrontation with two alternatives—cooperation or conflict, chose cooperation. In all remaining variations, the gain turned out to be quantitatively less.[9]

Possible Approaches to Settlement

Soviet-American consultations may, along with other accompanying factors (the position of the world community, the role of the United Nations, the participation of the parties in direct confrontation), play a prominent role in the settlement of regional conflicts.

It is clear that, without mutual understanding and movement towards one another, conflict settlement will remain just good intentions. Here it is important to accurately determine the opportunities the great powers

have at their disposal (as opposed to what the direct conflict participants must do), and concentrate attention on these.

The question must be raised first of all as to the need for reviewing the role of the ideological factor. It would be unrealistic, of course, to talk about eliminating this altogether—sympathies and antipathies of the great powers are determined to a great extent by the reigning ideology, and it would be impossible to completely ignore this in the process of policy formulation. In addition to the ideological factor, however, it is important to take into account the international-legal aspects of any conflict and of decisions taken by the conflicting sides. This enables us to move outside the framework of a black-white scenario and find a suitable basis for compromise.

Another important aspect of possible approaches by the USSR and the United States towards regulating regional conflicts might be found in a serious reevaluation of the role of force in them. The military-political situation of today's world does not permit us to seriously rely on a military victory, or on the opportunity to attain optimal results as a consequence of military victory. The USSR and the United States have become convinced of this through their bitter experience. The attempts of other countries to rely on use of military power (Israel in the Near East, the Republic of South Africa in Angola) have also confirmed that, even if one side has absolute military supremacy, the political results are often counterproductive and do not yield the expected outcome.

Both great powers explain their shipments of arms and ammunition to friendly countries through the necessity of providing them the right to "legitimate self-defense," which does not raise any doubts in itself. But later on, as a rule, the problem arises—what are the limits of this "self-defense"? How do the government and military circles of the countries involved understand it? This is an area usually shrouded in secrecy, and as a result arms delivered for self-defense are either used for offensive purposes or evoke a response from the other side, which has led to an arms race in many regions of the world. Or they are used for internal conflicts against their own people.

Restraint by the great powers in the use of force against third countries acquires special significance. The U.S. military action in Panama in December of 1989 cannot help but elicit the sharpest criticism, regardless of how it is explained. A responsibility lies on the USSR and the United States, as well as on the other great powers which are permanent members of the UN Security Council, to observe the UN Charter and maintain international peace. The more frequently they ignore this responsibility, the more other states will violate norms of international law and ignore the UN Charter. In addition, the military action of a great power against a small state intensifies polarization in international relations, since this country will be compelled to turn for assistance to another—in which it sees a protector—great power.

Still another component of a new approach could be the development of a unique set of "rules of conduct" for the USSR and United States in their treatment of regional conflicts as well as with respect to one another. An attempt was made, during the 1972 signing of Principles of Mutual Relations Between the U.S. and USSR, to formulate some kind of general concepts of such "rules" (avoid actions capable of exacerbating a situation, avoid undertaking threatening actions with respect to one another and third countries, etc.). However, this attempt was not reinforced by a more detailed elaboration of the "rules of conduct," most importantly, by a mechanism to ensure observance of the rules, and it did not lead to success. Perhaps the only positive development resulting from the ideas contained in the Principles of Mutual Relations Between the United States and the USSR is the 1985 agreement between both sides on establishing centers to decrease the nuclear threat. The lack of precise and unambiguous agreement regarding "rules of conduct" between the USSR and the United States thus reduces opportunities for mutual control over their actions in specific regions of the world and serves as a constant source of reciprocal claims and accusations.

Finally, an extremely important aspect of new possible approaches by the USSR and the United States to the problems of settling regional conflicts must be seen in immeasurably greater utilization of UN mechanisms and capabilities to achieve these ends. Without this, any actions of the two powers—even those dictated by the finest aspirations—may be seen by third countries as a kind of diktat, as a policy of "concurrent dominion." Taking into account the extremely important role of both states in this question, such an attitude on the part of the world community—including the sides in conflict—could become an obstacle along the path to a genuine settlement.

What would such a balanced and mutually acceptable approach to settlement of regional conflicts yield? First of all, it would probably help both great powers maintain a proper distance from these clashes and from one another. It is necessary, on the one hand, for the feeling of direct involvement by each of them in one crisis or another to disappear, for the understanding to return that they are primarily affecting the interests of other countries, groups, and political organizations; and on the other hand, conflicts must stop being perceived as a continuation or alternate form of confrontation between East and West, between the USSR and the United States. This would also be advantageous to the direct participants, insofar as they would have an increased level of independence and responsibility for their own decisions.

Secondly, such an approach would be oriented to a minimal extent on military decisionmaking. To the contrary, it would encourage the taking of political steps towards a settlement. In addition to its purely objective value in the form of decreasing numbers of casualties, reducing the level of violence would simultaneously

provide incentive to the sides to pursue a policy of national reconciliation, and would push them towards seeking compromises.

Thirdly, such an approach would not simply be based on international law, but would advance it forward in the practice of international relations to the position it should long ago have occupied in the system of relations of civilized states. In respecting the aspiration of each country, every nation, to independence and autonomy in its internal affairs, international law, reinforced by the authority of the great powers and the United Nations, could successfully regulate international relations and the especially controversial issues therein.

Fourthly, and finally, such an approach could turn regional conflicts into a subject of concern not only for the direct participants or the great powers supporting them, but for the entire world community as well.

Of course, here we are talking just about a possible approach to dealing with conflicts, and not about the mechanism for settling them. A mechanism for this process will merit special discussion. In this regard we must deal with the system (or subsystem) of negotiations and consultations, on the functioning of various structures of regional organizations and their combination with UN capabilities and great power actions. It is evident that all these mechanisms can operate effectively if we succeed in determining and implementing the general approach described above to the problems of conflict settlement.

Footnotes

1. See, for example, the critique of "general conflict theory" in the book "International Conflicts," Moscow, 1972, pp 27-29

2. T. Schelling, "The Strategy of Conflict," Cambridge, Mass., 1960, p 253

3. For a critique of A. Rappaport's theory in Soviet literature see V.V. Zhurkin, "The United States and International Political Crises," Moscow, 1975, pp 109-111

4. "Windows of Opportunity—From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations," edited by G. Allison, W. Ury, and B. Allyn, Cambridge, Mass., 1989, p 9

5. Calculated from "Local Wars—In History and Modern Day," ed. I.Ye. Shavrov, Moscow, 1981, pp 296-303

6. D.G. Tomashevskiy: "Leninist Ideas in the Modern International Relations," Moscow, 1971, p 140

7. H. Kissinger, "White House Years," Boston, 1979, p 1249

8. "The Department of State Bulletin," December 1985, pp 1-7

9. R. Axelrod, "Evolution of Cooperation," N.Y., 1984

Strategic Role of Air Defense Examined

914K0004B Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to press 26 Jul 90) pp 12-20

[Article by Yuriy Nikolayevich Gaydukov, candidate for membership of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute, and Sergey Mikhaylovich Rogov, doctor of historical sciences and department chief at the same institute: "Air Defense and Its Role in the Strategic Balance"]

[Text] The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the USSR and the United States, which is currently being prepared for signing and whose basic parameters were agreed upon at the meeting between President M.S. Gorbachev and President George Bush in Washington, is intended to determine the character of the military strategic balance in the '90s and at the beginning of the 21st century. The stability of this balance will depend not only upon the equilibrium of strategic offensive arms at reduced levels but also upon the future development of strategic defense. After all, both today and in the foreseeable future, stability is and will continue to be determined first and foremost by the preservation of conditions of "mutual assured destruction." Here, strictly speaking, lies the meaning of the admission that nuclear war between the "superpowers" must not be conducted and that such a war cannot be won.

We must not tolerate any shift of emphasis in strategic competition from one sphere to another. This would not only swallow up those resources freed as a result of reductions of offensive components but would also lead to an erosion of stability. The following stage of talks on strategic arms reductions must be characterized by an all-embracing approach, **with an agenda that includes questions of limiting not only offensive but also defensive systems.**

Rivalry between offensive and defensive weapons has occurred over the entire history of military affairs. The appearance of nuclear weapons did not halt this process but simply made substantial changes to it. In addition to increasing strategic offensive arms, both the USSR and the United States began to devote considerable attention to the development of strategic defense, that is to say of forces and systems capable of lessening the damage from a nuclear attack.

All strategic defense measures can be divided up according to goals—the defense of territory or the protection of installations—and also according to whether the means employed are active or passive.

Passive defense includes measures to evade a strike (maneuver), and to increase the protection and camouflage of targets of nuclear attack. Point [objektovaya] passive defense includes, for example, the creation of "hardened" [zashchishchennyy] command posts for silo-based and mobile missile launchers. Territorial passive defense is usually understood to mean protection of the civilian sector.

Active defense is intended to destroy the opponent's means of attack and includes means for opposing all three components of the offensive strategic triad—long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM], and submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM]—that is to say, air defense, antiballistic-missile [ABM] defense, and antisubmarine warfare assets. Their goal is usually the protection of installations, although this fact does not, theoretically, exclude attempts to create territorial defense.

Since long-range bombers were the first means of delivering nuclear weapons, air defense has emerged as the most developed component of strategic defense.

In the second half of the '40s, when the United States had a nuclear monopoly, in addition to the elaboration of strictly nuclear weapons, the USSR placed particular emphasis on the development of air defense. In 1948, the Air Defense Forces were made into an independent branch of the Armed Forces, which included fighter aviation, antiaircraft artillery, air surveillance, early-warning, and communications troops, antiaircraft searchlight troops, and units of barrage balloon troops.

It must be noted that in the United States, the potential of Soviet air defense to rebuff an American nuclear attack was evaluated as being quite low. A document of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 21 December 1948 and entitled "Evaluation of Present Plans for Strategic Air Attack" said: "The overall effectiveness of Soviet ground-based defense systems will cede to the effectiveness of those means which the allies encountered and overcame in World War II."[1]

Henceforth, strategic defense was faced repeatedly with tasks of scale. "Modern warfare demands not only the reliable defense of individual installations, as was the case in the past war, but also a carefully thought out and organized system of measures to ensure the stable functioning of the entire national economy and the reliable defense of the country's territory" former USSR Minister of Defense A.A. Grechko asserted.[2] The Air Defense Forces obtained missile technology and were in a state of permanent combat readiness to accomplish the tasks of protecting the population, administrative and political centers, and the Armed Forces from aerial attack. In the words of former Commander in Chief of the Air Defense Forces P.F. Batitskiy, they "must not under any circumstances permit an aerial opponent to break through to defended installations and force groupings."[3]

However, in recent years, American specialists have considered that losses of strategic bombers from Soviet air defense assets would amount to no more than 10-15 percent. B. Blair, for example, of the Brookings Institute, writes that "the Soviets will be unable to rapidly unleash an effective defense against penetration by U.S. bombers. The present reserves of point defense, mainly stationary 'ground-to-air' missiles, may be easily circumvented or destroyed with the help of the ICBM's, SLCM's, or short-range attack missiles [SRAM] with which the bombers themselves are armed. As a result, even by conservative estimates, 80 percent of American bombers would be able to effect a successful penetration of [the Soviets'] air defense to a great depth."[4]

Basic Stages of Development of the Air Defense of North America

The development of air defense in the United States itself took a different course from that in the USSR. In order to show the basic trends of the development of strategic air defense, it is necessary to analyze the sequence of the buildup of the air defense forces and to examine the interconnection between this process and the realization of other programs, taking account of the geostrategic position of the North American continent and the historically formed views and traditions of the U.S. military political establishment in the sphere of military organizational development.

Several basic stages can be singled out in the development of the air defense forces of North America.

At **the first stage** (the second half of the '40s)—that is to say when the Soviet Union did not yet have nuclear weapons and delivery systems—little attention was paid to strategic air defense, in spite of the fact that the Air Defense Command of the U.S. Air Force had been formed as early as in 1946. National Security Council Report No. 20/4 dated 23 November 1948 states that the USSR "is not in a position to effect a prepared, large-scale attack against the territory of the United States."[5]

Only at **the second stage** (the '50s), after elimination of the American monopoly on nuclear weapons and delivery systems, did the United States begin to fear the possibility of a Soviet retaliatory strike. Although the main emphasis was placed on developing the strategic aspect of the nuclear arms race, National Security Council Directive No. 68/2 demanded that the systems of air defense and civil defense be "significantly expanded" to "limit war and create reasonable guarantees that the United States will be able to survive an initial strike and continue to pursue its goals."[6]

This stage was characterized by an intensive buildup of the Air Defense Forces. The year 1950 saw the creation of the Air Defense Command of the Ground Forces [ARADKOM]. The operation "Tracking the Sky" [Slezheniye za nebom] began in 1952; it involved the deployment, in 48 states, of an initial 10,000 round-the-clock observation posts, followed by a further 17,000. The Ground Observer Corps was created on a

voluntary basis and consisted of about 387,000 men, not counting 170,000 in the reserve. Use was also made of naval early-warning aircraft. Mass deployment of air defense aviation began and, by the end of the '50s, numbered 2,600 fighter-interceptors.[7]

The Americans also armed themselves with several thousand air defense missiles, including unguided "Genie" air-to-air missiles and "Falcon" guided missiles, "Nike Hercules" ground-to-air medium-range (200 Km) missiles and "BOMARK" long-range (700 Km) airforce missiles. All of these missiles could be equipped with nuclear warheads. [8] In addition, the Navy deployed its own "Talos" "surface-to-air" missile.

The creation of a radar network began at the same time. Its main task was to provide the Strategic Air Command with a two-hour warning in order to enable it to put bombers into the air. The first line of radar stations—"Pinetree"—was deployed in 1952, on the Canadian-American border along the 55th parallel, and a second—the "DEW" distant early warning line—in 1957, further to the North along the 77th parallel. In accordance with the conception of "defense in depth," such stations were also soon deployed outside the North American continent—in Greenland, Iceland, Scotland, and even Turkey. Difficulties with regard to the battle management of jet fighters and anti-aircraft missile complexes led to the creation of the "SAGE" system, which made use of computers for the first time. The second stage is also connected with the creation in 1954, on the basis of the Air Defense Command of the Air Force and ARADKOM, of the Continental United States Air Defense Command [CONAD] which, between 1957 and 1958, was transformed into the North America Air Defense Command [NORAD]. About $2 billion were spent every year on maintaining the air defense system in a state of permanent combat readiness.[9]

Since those times, the anti-aircraft defense of North America has been built on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the governments of the United States and Canada, first signed in 1957.[10] Its structural evolution has been influenced by various political, strategic, and military technological factors. The shift of emphasis in the development of the strategic potential of the USSR from bomber aviation to ICBMs at the end of the '50s and the beginning of the '60s exerted a considerable influence upon the structural formation of the Air Defense Forces. The Soviet Union's asymmetrical response to the American military threat devalued U.S. military efforts in the sphere of both offensive and defensive weapons.

The **third stage** (the '60s and the beginning of the '70s) was marked by an overall lowering of the significance assigned to the Air Defense Forces in the development of the strategic arms of the United States. At this time, nuclear missile strike warning systems and space control systems began to be developed, and this was reflected in the tasks being resolved by the NORAD command. A memorandum from Secretary of State for Defense R. Macnamara to President L. Johnson dated 3 December 1964 said that "the contribution of air defense to achieving this goal is extremely dependent upon the overall effectiveness of our ABM defense."[11] In 1968, in connection with the broadening of those tasks being resolved by NORAD, the Air Defense Command was reorganizaed into the Aerospace Defense Command [komandovaniye aerokosmicheskoy oborony].

Measures were also implemented in the sphere of passive defense, and at increasing the stability of NORAD's system of tactical command and control in the face of the staggering effects of a nuclear explosion. In 1966, a NORAD command post was put into operation, built in the granite bowels of the Cheyenne mountains close to Colorado Springs, and it remains the most "hardened" command post of the U.S. Armed Forces.[12]

However, technical difficulties and the enormous financial outlay required made the creation of a territorial ABM system impossible. In the absence of protection against a nuclear missile strike, it became senseless to build up active air defense systems. The reduction and subsequent removal from operational status of anti-aircraft missile complexes began; the Air Defense Forces were also heavily cut back, although their qualitative improvement continued.

The **fourth stage** (the '70s) saw a reinterpretation by the U.S. military political leadership of the role and place of strategic air defense in the overall macrosystem of the American-Soviet military strategic balance. The establishment of nuclear parity led to a change in the basic tasks assigned to NORAD. In 1974, Secretary of State for Defense J. Schlesinger stated that the basic designation of an air defense system must be to guarantee protection of the sovereignty of aerospace in peacetime.[13] Such an approach testified to a rejection of the attempt to create territorial air defense at this period and was aimed at organizing protection of the most important strategic installations, those ensuring "guaranteed nuclear retribution." This situation was strengthened by the 1975 extension of the American-Canadian agreement on joint air defense.

The **fifth stage** (from the beginning of the '80s) is distinguished by increased efforts at extensive modernization of the air defense system of North America. The main reason for forcing this process was the revival of the concept of territorial defense by means of creating a disposed-in-depth ABM system under the SDI program. At about this time, the U.S. Department of Defense put forward the "Air Defense Initiative" [ADI], which attracted far less public attention. It was to augment the extensive ABM system with reliable protection against strategic bombers and cruise missiles.

In 1981, the Joint Air Defense Command of North America was renamed the Joint Aerospace Defense Command of North America. The chairman of the interdepartmental conciliation commission on implementing ADI, Brigadier General of the Air Force R.

Rankin, stated that although the ADI is an independent program, both areas of work (SDI and ADI) are being planned and implemented simultaneously. As the defense minister's report noted, "our ADI research is scheduled in such a way as to enable us to make a decision about the full-scale construction of an improved air defense at the same time as a decision about ABM defense."[14] Moreover, stressed F. Carlucci, the goal of ADI "cannot be achieved by way of a partial improvement of existing systems; substantial progress is required in developing the technologies of long-range interceptor missile detection, antisubmarine warfare, and tactical command and control systems."[15]

Taking account of the prospects for the development of offensive aerospace weapons and the increased role of space-based weapons systems in the conduct of military operations at various levels, many specialists in the United States are advocating the need to expand interaction between strategic defensive systems.

This problem was tackled by special research entitled "The Structure of Strategic Defense 2000" conducted within the framework of the Pentagon, where it was recommended that air defense, ABM defense, and aerospace defense be regarded as a strategic defensive triad. The linking of all information systems and weapons assets in a single cycle of military command and control, regardless of their mode of basing, must be guaranteed by a system of military command and control which is integrated, in its turn, into the global system of operational management of the U.S. Armed Forces. [16]

Proceeding from this, the basic areas of work on creating a promising air defense are: the elaboration of an extensive airspace observation system (ground-based, aircraft-based, and space-based), capable of detecting strategic bombers and cruise missiles at maximum distance; the elaboration of an all-embracing conception for an air defense system; research into the optimal structure of a system for the control of combat operations which combines all-component elements into a unified whole. However, expenditure on ADI, as the table shows, falls many times short of that on SDI and space defense.

Organization of an Air Defense System

The operational disposition of this system includes air defense regions, sectors, and zones and embraces the territory of the United States, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland. At the same time, air defense resources are mainly concentrated around the perimeter of the territory of the United States, without disposition in depth.

Expenditure on Scientific Research and Experimental Design Work for Components of the Strategic Defensive Triad, in Millions of Dollars

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
SDI	1,397	2,759	3,279	3,551	3,627	3,537
ADI	103	106	36	49	156	253
Space Defense	198	200	203	204	0	95*

*Only the defense program of the U.S. Army.

Calculated according to: "Report of Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1987 Budget, FY 1988 Authorization Request, and FY 1987-1991 Defense Programs." Washington, 1986, p 233; "Report of Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci to the Congress on the Amended FY 1988/FY 1989 Biennial Budget." Washington, 1988, pp 240-241; "Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1990 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives." Washington, 1989, p 523; "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990-1991. Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives." Washington, 1989, pp 138, 171, 172.

The air defense system includes: the radar stations of the "DEW" and "Pinetree" lines; the unified airspace observation system "JSS"; the radar stations of the "Seek Igloo" system; the system of over-the-horizon backscatter radar stations; E-3 airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACS); fighter aviation and the system of tactical command and control.

Over-the-horizon backscatter radar stations are regarded as the first echelon of the system of airspace surveillance in the United States. There are plans to commission four radar posts at the beginning of the '90s, each of which will include a radar station with a warning range of 2,000 nautical miles (about 3,800 km), a center for the control and processing of information, and communications and data transfer facilities. [17]

In selecting the deployment sites for radar posts, the U.S. military leadership seeks to ensure that there is mutual overlap of the coverage of over-the-horizon backscatter radar stations in all directions with the exception of the Artic coast of Canada (due to the complexity of disseminating high-frequency radar signals in regions of the Far North). In order to cover this area, two airborne threat detection lines [rubezha obnaruzheniya vozdushnyykh tseley] have presently been established. The first consists of the "DEW" distant early warning line ground-based stations and E-3 AWACS aircraft; the second is made up of the ground-based stations of the "Pinetree" line.

The "DEW" line includes 31 radar stations situated along the 70th parallel. The replacement of the obsolete radar stations by 52 new ones has begun under the program to create the North Warning System [NWS]. The overall cost of the NWS has been estimated at $1.29 billion.[18]

At the present time, the "Pinetree" line consists of 24 radar stations in the southern regions of Canada along

the American-Canadian border. The airborne threat detection limit of the posts passes along a latitude of 55 degrees North and, at the same time, is the front line for vectoring fighter-interceptors to the target.

The second echelon of the aerial surveillance system uses the JSS and "Seek Igloo" systems. The JSS system was commissioned in 1983 and includes 84 radar stations deployed along the perimeter of the continental part of the United States, and in Alaska and Canada. Some of these radar stations have been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Federal Civil Aviation Authority and are used simultaneously for resolving air defense tasks and for directing air traffic.

The "Seek Igloo" system includes 14 new distant early warning stations; these are serviced by a total of between eight and 10 specialists from the firm "General Electric," working under Air Force contracts (prior to 1987, every radar station required about 120 airforce specialists). The replacement of old radar stations, which used technology from the '50s, by new ones at a cost of $17.9 million enables the Air Force Command in the Alaskan zone to save about $100 million every year as a result of reduced operating costs.[19]

For interception and airspace surveillance at distances which significantly exceed the operational radius of ground-based stations, the NORAD command has created and is constantly improving an air defense distant intercept maneuver group [manevrennaya gruppa dalnego perekhvata PVO] consisting of two F-15 fighters, an E-3 AWACS aircraft, and a KCS-135 tanker aircraft.

Use of the E-3 AWACS aircraft offers a graphic example of the way in which one electronic system may exert a strategic influence upon the military balance in a specific sphere of confrontation. Without the AWACS system it would be impossible to intercept aircraft carrying air-launched cruise missiles prior to the accomplishment by them of their combat task. One of the advantages of this system, apart from the creation of a external radar field, is considered to be its potential for use as a communications relay facility, linking F-15 fighters and KC-135 tanker aircraft via satellite channels with the ground-based air defense control center of the region.

The use of E-3 AWACS aircraft substantially increases the stability of the system of control and the combat effectiveness of the air defense assets as a whole. Their use for vectoring F-15 fighters makes it possible to extend the limits of airborne threat detection and interception to a distance of more than 1,000 km from the borders of the United States.

Bearing in mind the geostrategic position of North America, the rapidly changing meteorological conditions in its Northern part, and also the historically developed structure of the air defense system (only air force fighters used as weapons assets), the presence of KC-135 tanker aircraft in the operational command of NORAD acquires particular significance. Their use enables distant intercept maneuver groups to patrol for more than nine hours in threatened areas.

Fighter aviation constitutes the sole active means of North American air defense system. Its main grouping is deployed in the border regions of the United States and Canada, and also in Iceland.

As R. Cheney, U.S. secretary of state for defense, notes, "with the exception of a relatively small quantity of fighters of the regular Air Force and the reserve, the United States has no active means to protect it against nuclear attack."[20] According to a Pentagon enquiry for the 1991 financial year, air defense fighter aviation numbers one squadron of the regular Air Force (18 aircraft) and 12 squadrons of the Airforce of the National Guard (216 aircraft). In addition, NORAD's operational command includes two squadrons of fighter-interceptors of the Canadian Air Force.[21] Permanent combat alert duty is performed by American fighter-interceptors F-15, F-16, F-4, and F-106, and Canadian CF-18s. Their main task in peacetime is to intercept and identify unknown aircraft which approach North American airspace. In time of war, they must effect limited protection against bombers and cruise missiles.

An evaluation of the combat potential of NORAD's air defense must note its strong points:

—use of the AWACS airborne warning and control system on E-3 aircraft, which makes it possible to intercept an airborne opponent at all ranges of altitude, prior to fulfilment of the combat task and in diverse variants of conducting combat operations;

—the presence of highly effective and maneuverable means of combating an airborne opponent;

—refueling of fighter-interceptors in the air;

—a high degree of reliability and accuracy in the identification of airborne targets;

—permanent combat readiness of the air defense alert forces and extensive potential for their reinforcement in critical situations in main areas;

—a high level of combat proficiency on the part of flight personnel and control center operators (the average flying time of air defense pilots is 400 hours per year);

—the possibility of close interaction with the forces and assets of Canadian air defense and NATO as a whole, including American frontline forces in Europe, and with American forces in the Far East, thanks to modernization of the system of command and control and communications.

The Role of Strategic Air Defense at the Contemporary Stage

In the '80s, the concept of "direct defense" was introduced into the documents of the U.S. Department of

Defense, a concept which is interpreted as "deterrence by way of denial," that is to say the ability to "stop aggression before it achieves its goals."[22] At the same time, it is asserted that "the deterrent value of strategic defense is derived from the effect of this defense on Soviet estimates of the price and success of attack." At the present time (if we do not count antisubmarine warfare resources), the air defense system of North America is the only deployed component of "direct defense."

In this way, it appears possible to draw basic conclusions.

First, a powerful air defense system has been created in North America which combines an airspace surveillance system disposed in depth and a system of weapons assets concentrated in one grouping.

Second, the American air defense system has a targeted character and is intended, first and foremost, to protect the strategic offensive potential of the United States, namely strategic offensive weapons systems and command and control and communications facilities.

Third, the main emphasis in the organizational development of air defense is placed on the development of effective means of early warning and tactical command and control, while weapons themselves play a relatively secondary role (a small quantity of fighter-interceptors in the absence of anti-aircraft missile complexes).

Fourth, thanks to such a structure and technical potential, the American air defense system is highly efficient where the criterion of "cost effectiveness" is concerned.

Fifth, taking account of the fact that the aviation component of the Soviet strategic triad is not large (162 heavy bombers in 1989, of which only 97 were equipped with cruise missiles [23], and also of the differences in the geostrategic position of the United States and the USSR, the American air defense system is capable of adequately resolving the tasks with which it is confronted.

On the whole, however, it is imperative to stress that like any other means of active and passive strategic defense, and being only one of the components of the dynamic macrosystem of strategic parity in the nuclear missile era, the U.S. air defense system is not in a position to guarantee protection either against a first or a retaliatory nuclear strike. The ability of contemporary strategic defense means to partially limit the damage from these strikes cannot overcome the situation of "guaranteed mutual destruction."

At the same time, the air defense system has a number of aspects which are capable of sharply destabilizing the situation. In connection with the low survivability of ground-based command and control centers and information systems, the likelihood of authority to use active air defense means (including "air-to-air missiles with a nuclear payload) being delegated to E-3 AWACS aircraft cannot be ruled out, something which would make permanent political control over the development of the situation impossible. Anxiety on this account is very substantial.

The implementation of those programs whose technology is being elaborated within the framework of the ADI may also sharply undermine strategic stability. In essence, they are aimed at creating strategic territorial defense. The question arises as to how the modernization of the air defense system reflects upon strategic stability in conditions of the preservation of the ABM Treaty and the prospects for the signing of the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty between the USSR and the United States.

As is well known, at the Soviet-American talks on strategic offensive arms, agreement was reached to the effect that bombers armed with free-fall bombs [bomby svobodnogo padeniya] and short-range nuclear missiles are counted as one warhead within an overall ceiling of 6,000 units for each side. Consequently, B-1 and B-2 bombers, which can carry eight, 10, 12, 16, and more "SRAM-2" missiles and aerial bombs are counted as one warhead. As a result, if the United States were to deploy 75 B-2 bombers as well as 100 B-1 bombers, these aircraft could carry, in excess of the 6,000- warhead limit, between 2,000 and 3,000 warheads capable of destroying "hardened" targets.

The report of former secretary of state for defense F. Carlucci to Congress noted that any reduction of the threat from ICBMs as a result both of an arms control agreement and of the creation of an ABM system will intensify the threat posed by bombers and cruise missiles. In our view, reductions in the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs along with upholding of the ABM Treaty must not lead to the center of gravity in the arms race being shifted to aviation systems and means of combating them. It seems that further development of the strategic arms reduction process must be extended not only to offensive arms and ABM defense but also to the other components of the strategic triad.

Given the creation of a new structure of strategic forces, the historical particularities of the military organizational development and weapons development of both sides must be subjected to careful analysis. There are clearly many questions which cannot be resolved unilaterally and which require joint efforts on the basis of agreed criteria, taking account of the task of ensuring strategic stability.

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23. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 December 1989

United States and "Europe-92"

914K0004C Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to press 26 Jul 90) pp 21-28

[Article by Sergey Viktorovich Smolnikov, candidate of economic sciences and senior instructor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

[Text] On the threshold of the last decade of the 20th century the European Economic Community is quickly turning into a unique pole of world economic gravity and economic strength. Of course, if we compare the economic potential and level of economic development in individual EEC countries and the United States, the comparison is frequently not in the Europeans' favor, but after the national markets of 12 EEC countries merge on 1 January 1993 into a single market, in which the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) will probably also be included at the same time, Western Europe will represent a more significant economic entity than the United States. Even today, for example, the combined GDP of the EEC countries is approximately equivalent to the American GDP in cost terms. The completion of the processes involved in the creation of a single "Euromarket" by 31 December 1992 will have a sizable economic impact: The increment in the GNP of the integrated countries as a result of market expansion will amount to 11-35 percent over the long range.[1] Will American companies be able to enjoy the fruits of "Europe-92" on an equal basis with the Europeans? Judging by all indications, there is no certainty of this in the United States.

"Euromarket": Fog of Uncertainty

The Americans are seriously worried that the present changes in the EEC will turn it into something like a "European fortress" pursuing a protectionist policy in relations with the United States. "We," former U.S. representative to the EEC A. Kingon said in this connection, "are worried that the community might veer toward protectionism on the road to 1992, either consciously or, more probably, unconsciously."[2]

The Americans are disturbed, for example, by the EEC's demand for "mutuality" in the financial service sector.

People in the United States particularly want to know whether an individual EEC country will have the right to veto an American bank's decision to open a branch in another EEC country if it feels that its banks do not have the proper access to the United States. Will this kind of national interpretation be applicable to the term "mutuality"? Besides this, American trade representatives in talks with the EEC have insisted that branches of American TNC's in Europe enjoy the status of "European companies." Furthermore, the percentage of U.S. goods produced by subsidiaries of Japanese corporations is rising. People in America are already worried that the vehicles produced on U.S. territory by Japanese firms

will be subject to Japanese trade quotas when they are exported to EEC countries. What kind of commercial status will these goods have on the "Euromarket" after 1992?

The U.S. position at talks with the EEC on the settlement of controversial aspects of trade policy related to the creation of the unified community market was explained by the special representative of the United States in these talks, C. Hills. First of all, the community should grant American companies in Western Europe the same commercial and legal opportunities as European companies. Second, the existing national restrictions in EEC states on trade with third countries should not become the norm for the entire community after 1992. Third, the EEC should promote the liberalization of international commercial and economic exchange on the basis of GATT principles and the fulfillment of the new agreements that were reached during the Uruguay round of multilateral trade talks. Fourth, when guarantees of the operations of the companies of non-community countries are being coordinated in the EEC, the common guarantees of this activity should be based on more liberal terms rather than on restrictive ones. The fifth and final stipulation is that the establishment of standards and issuance of industrial permits should be conducted openly, with a view to the interests of foreign companies.

People in the United States are also suffering some discomfort over the indication that the unified European market will not be confined only to the markets of EEC countries. According to an EEC-EFTA agreement, goods from association countries will enjoy benefits and privileges comparable to those of the community members' goods.

This agreement envisages the elimination of the last remaining restrictions in the trade between the two groups, the reconciliation of standards and technical specifications, and the elimination of the privileges of national companies in the distribution of government contracts for construction and telecommunications projects. The creation of a special legal-institutional base to regulate disputes between the partners is also being considered.

Experts believe, however, that the EEC will retain its autonomy in matters of foreign trade policy toward third countries, including the United States. Nevertheless, the very fact that the West European free market zone is being expanded, without establishing the commercial conditions the Americans want, could cause them to lose part of their hypothetical profits.

To what extent are the American apprehensions regarding "fortress Europe" justified? In all probability, there are grounds for some of these apprehensions, particularly in the sectors of international economic exchange that are not regulated by GATT rules. This applies above all to banking services and telecommunications. The American side is urging the EEC to move toward liberalization in these spheres without waiting for the matters to be settled during the Uruguay round of GATT talks.

An analysis of the prospects for American business in connection with the creation of the unified market indicates clearly that "Europe-92" could offer substantial opportunities. The very fact that the community is highly integrated into the world economy, and the fact that Western Europe has such strong ties to the American economy in particular, will be a serious deterrent in the growth of European protectionism under any circumstances.

We should also remember that American business, according to renowned French expert J. Servan-Schreiber, is more accustomed to big markets than the European business community. Furthermore, the American TNC's, the bulwark of U.S. trade and economic activity in Western Europe, are still perceptibly ahead of their European competitors in terms of their market influence and their technological and investment potential. It is no coincidence that the U.S. academic community has a skeptical view of the American administration's worries about "Europe-92." American economists believe, on the contrary, that the creation of the unified market will lead to the growth of U.S. exports to West European countries, especially in such spheres as machine building and the extractive industry.[3]

In general, however, the creation of this market, combined with the intensification of economic relations in other parts of the world, will be one of the most powerful factors accelerating the growth of international trade: In 1991-1996 the average growth rate per year is expected to climb to around 10 percent (for the sake of comparison, the annual growth rate of world trade in 1979-1988 was 6.8 percent).[4]

Former member of the European Commission W. De Clerck expressed his opinion of the matter quite categorically. He said that the "concern about increased protectionism in Europe in 1992 is only partly sincere." He went on to say that "this is a wonderful idea that certain people came up with, a way of putting the community on the defensive in order to gain certain advantages at the talks. This is, in part if not in its entirety, a *tactical ruse* (italics ours—S.S.)."[5]

Nevertheless, the issue here does not seem to be confined only to the fear of protectionist tendencies in the "Europe-92" policy toward overseas competitors: In the final analysis, the United States itself certainly has not always conducted a liberal international trade policy. The real issue is more likely to be something else: The creation of the unified and extended markets will make Western Europe much more competitive in its own market and in world markets in the 1990s. According to estimates, for example, the creation of the "Euromarket" could lower production costs by 20-30 percent, including production costs in the high-technology industries—electronics, industrial plastics, and aerospace—i.e., in

the industries where the competition between America and Europe will be revived on a higher level in the near future.[6]

Will the New World be able to take additional measures to safeguard its strong competitive position in these areas of economic development and others? Paradoxically, the answer to this question of vital importance to the Americans will also depend largely on West European policy.

Investment Surprises

America's world economic prospects and the prospects of its domestic economy are directly connected, on the one hand, with the growth of labor productivity and, on the other, with the reduction of the federal budget deficit. Obviously, the resolution of these problems will depend largely on the choice of the right economic policy. In the opinion of FORTUNE, the American magazine, the best policy in the next 10-15 years would be one which would continue increasing the flow of foreign capital investments into the U.S. economy.[7]

Scenarios of development through capital imports anticipate the growth of the American foreign debt (in relation to the GNP) from the present figure of 11.5 percent to 28.7 percent by 2009. Annual net imports of capital will rise from the projected 1990 figure of 130 billion dollars to 457 billion by the end of the first decade of the 21st century. At the same time, this policy is expected to result in substantial economic growth, including a rise in all of the main macroeconomic indicators. In the next 18 years, for example, the GNP (in 1982 prices) will increase almost 1.8-fold. Real public income will increase by 11 percent.[8]

These scenarios, however, are based on the assumption that the main exporters of capital to the United States, and these certainly include Western Europe, will continue augmenting the scales of their investment activity in the American economy. Strictly speaking, this is what they have done to date. Will they continue to do this in the future?

There are some doubts about this. They are connected primarily with the new historical phase in Western Europe's relations with its Eastern neighbors. As a result of the recent institution of profound economic and political reforms in the East European countries, West European investors have taken a much greater interest in sizable capital investments in their economies. To this end, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, founded on the EEC's initiative, began operating in 1990. Economic steps of this kind, apparently taken to secure a new economic relationship with the East, suggest sweeping changes in the community's world economic policy.

It is easy to see that this tendency could have a significant effect on the global position of the community in the world economic structure, and particularly on its relations with the United States.

This is why people in the United States have been somewhat disturbed by the signs of the economic and political convergence of the two halves of Europe. These processes have evoked some interesting responses. On the one hand, the new wave of detente will objectively make additional resources available to the American economy as a result of military conversion. Experts have substantiated the possibility, for example, of the reduction of proportional military expenditures in the American GNP from 6 percent to 4 percent in the 1990s. The transfer to the "civilian economic model" in the United States, in which the swollen military sector will be confined to the framework of reasonable sufficiency, will have a favorable effect, according to many experts, on the overall economic and social situation in the country and on its worldwide competitive potential.

On the other hand, people in the United States are fully aware that Western Europe's investment potential is not unlimited. What if the economic perestroyka in the East European countries should divert a substantial portion of this potential, which might have served as a catalyst in the American economy under different circumstances? It is this possibility that arouses apprehension in the United States. "If foreign investors should choose to make dramatic changes in the direction of their capital investments," some American economists have warned, "the sudden devaluation of the dollar could send the economy of the United States and many other countries into a state of shock."[9] This is why people in the United States certainly do not want the rates and scales of economic convergence in the Old World to result in the radical redirection of the flow of West European investments from America to Eastern Europe: The economic consequences of this change could be quite serious for American economic interests.

By the same token, people in Western Europe also realize that the stable development of the U.S. economy is in the interest of all members of the world economy. In a situation of growing interdependence, any economic difficulties in America will also affect its partners. It also seems obvious, however, that the West Europeans are also aware of the economic advantages of renovating the economies of their neighbors in Eastern Europe.

From this standpoint, it would be wrong, according to EEC members, to miss the chance to include the East European economies in international division of labor by increasing the volume of Western investment there. The West European countries, and the FRG in particular, have such a great interest in restructuring economic relations with the East on a new basis that, in the words of L. Vanus, an expert from the American PlanEcon consulting firm, it would take real effort to keep the economy of East German (for example—S.S.) from climbing to a level exceeding the standard of living in the Common Market countries by the year 2000.[10]

It is true that existing forecasts put the annual increase in West German investments in the GDR economy alone at 10 billion dollars for at least the next 10 years.

American economists believe that the economies of several East European countries, especially the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will be among the most appealing sectors of the world economy for foreign investors, especially West Europeans, in the next few years. It is even possible that the East European countries might be as significant in the world economy in the next 10-15 years as Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea were in the 1970s and 1980s.

The United States might encounter this new shift in internationalization processes in its most rigid and unpredictable forms. It is possible, for example, that the economies of some East European countries (where average labor costs are one-fourth as high as in the EEC countries or even less, and where personnel skills and the level of production development are at a completely acceptable level for inclusion in the competitive struggle) might be used in the 1990s by West European business as an important bridgehead for an assault on the world market, and on the American market in particular. "What would happen," P. Hinson, head of the West European division of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, asked with unconcealed alarm, "if West Germany were to become a secret passageway for cheap East European goods?"[11]

There is no question that the United States will be facing a more formidable competitor when the new phase in East-West relations begins in Europe. It is difficult to say where the United States might encounter the toughest competition from Europeans in all postwar history—in traditional or high-technology branches, in the service sector, or in arms exports. It is probable that what we might call the "German sector" of the European economy, formed by the merging economies of the two German states, will play an increasingly prominent role in this struggle. A unified Germany will be capable of exerting considerable influence on Europe's overall position in competition with the United States, Japan, and the new industrial nations.

The relatively limited size of the domestic market (the combined population of the FRG and GDR is 80 million), which will stimulate the development of export production, the powerful West German economy, and the comparatively cheap but skilled manpower in the GDR are extremely valuable trump cards (especially the combination) in the competitive struggle American business will have to face in the 1990s.

In our opinion, we can also expect some changes in American investment policy in Western Europe in favor of the concentration of capital investments primarily in the FRG. After all, existing forecasts indicate that the "German sector" will display the most dramatic economic growth in the industrially developed world in the 1990s.[12] Furthermore, it is here that American economic, political, and military-strategic interests are most closely intertwined. Although American politicians realize that the future unified Germany could turn into a global economic power, with all of the ensuing international consequences, they are more likely to welcome the closer economic and political integration within the EEC framework than to see it as a threat to American interests. The "German factor" is another serious reason for the objective interest of American business in maximum participation in "Project 1992" and, consequently, in its success.

Technological Adjustments

The success in turning the West European region into a strong technological pole of today's world is making serious adjustments in American perceptions of the Old World.

It is fundamentally important, in our opinion, that the birth of the "technological Europe" is taking place at a time of objective qualitative changes in the very meaning of such terms as "international influence" and "global leadership."

Of course, it would be wrong to overestimate the technological level of Western Europe, but it would be just as wrong to underestimate it. After all, whereas scientific research in the region was developed primarily on the national level in the 1970s and 1980s, the EEC's integration efforts are expected to have a direct effect on science and technology in the 1990s, corresponding to the results of market integration within the "Europe-92" framework.

The foundation for "technological Europe" is being laid by numerous scientific and technical projects in EEC research programs and the broad-scale Eureka program. It is of fundamental importance that Eureka, for example, is being geared more and more to the needs of the market as the West European partners accumulate experience in collaboration. Many of the projects included in this program—now there are over 300—envisage the development, production, and marketing of new high-technology products: computers, communication systems, and energy- saving and waste-free technologies.

Within the context of U.S. economic relations with Western Europe, the progression toward "technological Europe" is producing a dual impact. On the one hand, the United States has had to compete in a new scientific-technical race and has had to pay more attention to the development of advanced technology; the structure of the American economy and American industry is changing and will continue to change as the high-technology sector and information-related service sector grow. In the search for additional financing to expand the scales and heighten the effectiveness of R & D projects, America has had to move toward a lower percentage of military research and a higher percentage of civilian scientific investigations. This is quite understandable: According to American experts, the effectiveness of civilian R & D is higher in some West European countries and Japan than in America.

On the other hand, the growing technological might of the Old World is objectively heightening the appeal of economic ties with it. The tendency toward the internationalization of science, technology, and production will acquire strong additional momentum as "technological Europe" takes shape in the 1990s.

The Americans also associate access to the results of R & D projects connected with "technological Europe" with their hope of overtaking the Europeans in marketing the results. It is no secret that the commercialization of the results of R & D projects is an extremely critical matter for the West European economy, but it is just as critical for the United States. Experts estimate that the innovation process in American firms takes 15 percent more time than in their rival Japanese firms and costs approximately 20 percent more.

From the standpoint of the possibility of acquiring managerial and organizational experience, technological cooperation with Japan seems more appealing to America than cooperation with Western Europe. This certainly does not mean that American business will overlook any chance to gain access to the West Europeans' scientific-technical developments, particularly those with the greatest potential promise in the "Euromarket" of 1992. It is no coincidence, for instance, that some branches of American companies in Europe took an active part, including financial participation, in the establishment of the European Technology Institute, which will concentrate on research in such sectors of advanced technology as biotechnology, new materials, and information science.

Although Western Europe is just beginning to build its own—pioneer—model of scientific and technical progress, some of its elements already exist. This is true, for example, of elementary particle physics. When the construction of the world's most powerful particle accelerator, costing 660 million dollars, was completed in Switzerland in August 1989, Western Europe, according to American experts, became capable of overtaking the United States in the strategically important sphere of high-energy physics.[13]

In the sphere of the commercialization of space exploration and the development and marketing of civilian aircraft, Western Europe's competitive position in relation to the United States also looks quite impressive. According to estimates, the West European Arianespace consortium will control 50 percent of the market for services connected with the launching of various space payloads in the 1990s. Europe's Airbus Industrie will increase its share of the world commercial aviation market by 5 percent by the end of 1990 in comparison with 1987, and it will do this by reducing the share of the American Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas companies.[14] Other examples of the perceptible reinforcement of Europe's position in the high-technology sphere could also be cited.

The regrouping of forces in West European industry, a process which has already begun, will contribute to this. The creation of the unified market is intensifying merger and acquisition processes. As a result, powerful world-class companies are coming into being in various branches of European industry, comparable to American corporations in terms of market influence and technological and investment potential and capable of competing with them on an equal basis. These new European giants are capable of achieving a much higher return on R & D expenditures. When they acquire small innovation firms, they leave their structure and autonomy virtually unchanged and simply expand their financial base.

There is no question that the interrelated processes connected with the creation of the unified market in 1992 and the progression toward "technological Europe" will increase the continent's economic and technological appeal to all other participants in world exchange dramatically, including the United States of America.

American captains of industry and politicians have had understandably ambivalent reactions to the prospect of a Western Europe representing a special pole of world economic and technological strength in the 1990s.

The opinions they have expressed have ranged from extremely negative predictions and inexorable warnings of the loss of U.S. economic and political influence to the over-optimistic expectations of those who are simply bewitched by the unprecedented speed of the changes in Europe. Scientific analysis, however, necessitates objectivity.

It goes without saying that friction, disputes, and disagreements have existed, do exist, and will continue to exist between America and Europe. In spite of all the complexity and ambiguity of the processes occurring in the Western half of Europe, however, as 1992 draws closer, an objective look at these processes reveals more positive than negative features for the American economy and the whole world economy. A huge market is being created and will offer great business opportunities. Western Europe's technological position is growing stronger, and there is more interest in partnership with Europe in high-technology branches. In other words, "Europe-92" could accelerate the growth of world productive forces.

Some people might say that the creation of the unified market will heighten the danger of protectionism on the part of the EEC, especially in economic sectors not regulated by GATT rules at this time. This is partly true, but it is also true that the spheres outside international trade regulation are gradually becoming the subject of multilateral negotiation, and talks on controversial aspects of international economic affairs usually produce mutually acceptable solutions.

The increasing interdependence of the Old and New Worlds and the equalization of their positions in the world economy, which began with the movement toward

"Europe-92," are more likely to engender compromise than conflict in American-West European relations. In the broader context, they are more likely to strike a balance in world economic affairs than to create disparities. Just as in any other development of this type and these dimensions, engendered by the intensification of economic internationalization, there are many more objective pluses than incidental (but inevitable) drawbacks and minuses.

Footnotes

1. THE ECONOMIST, 18 November 1989, p 81.
2. WORLD LINK, January-February 1989, p 22.
3. JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, 26 April 1989.
4. BUSINESS WEEK, 16 October 1989, p 94.
5. WORLD LINK, January-February 1989, p 28.
6. DER SPIEGEL, 1988, No 19, p 28.
7. FORTUNE, 18 December 1989, p 53.
8. Ibid., pp 52-53.
9. Ibid., p 66.
10. Ibid., p 88.
11. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 27 November 1989, p 42.
12. According to preliminary estimates, the West German GNP had already increased by 4.6 percent in 1989 (the highest indicator of the last 13 years). The processes referred to as the "second economic miracle" are expected to continue and grow stronger in the current decade (TIME, 13 November 1989, pp 38-40).
13. TIME, 18 September 1989, p 45.
14. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 5 September 1988, p 54.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Managing the Decline?

914K0004D Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to press 26 Jul 90) pp 29-32

[Article by Pierre Hassner, professor and lead associate at the Center for International Research, Paris, translated by N.B. Yaroshenko]

[Text] The reform of NATO and the Warsaw Pact can be seen either as the continuation of their life or as the creation of a different system, regardless of whether it will serve as the foundation of a new, more "European" balance of power or be based on pan-European cooperation; it could be a combination of both. For the last 20 years the author has defended the minimalist, evolutionist position in all arguments. The problem, however, is that this position has already become almost anachronistic because of public pressure and partly as a result of the actions of governments themselves. The changes that are taking place with the tacit consent of the Soviet Union, and sometimes at its suggestion, could make the Warsaw Pact unsuitable even for the performance of the political functions for which it was officially established. In turn, this decline could also have a ruinous effect on NATO, which would not be able to play its traditional role of the "architectural framework" of the Western community. The mutual embraces of the alliances will only underscore and accelerate the process of their decline.

Of course, this opinion can only be expressed with certain reservations: First of all, the alliances are far from symmetrical; second, they still have an important role to play in military deterrence and in arms limitation talks. This, however, does not change the fact that they cannot, in my opinion, continue to be viewed as the main instruments of the political, social, and economic changes that will be characteristic of the new phase of international relations in Europe.

From the military standpoint, the North Atlantic alliance is more important to the West than the Warsaw Pact is to the East. There are two obvious reasons: the geopolitical non-integrity of Warsaw Pact and the integrity of the Warsaw Pact; the bilateral pacts in the East and the multilateral nature of the treaty of the Western alliance. Furthermore, the United States' role and influence in Europe and the rest of the world depend at least as much on economic, cultural, and other relations on the societal level as on military and diplomatic relations between states. Although these contacts, particularly in the economic sphere, could lead to conflicts that will no longer be restrained by the sense of mutual military danger, they will probably continue to exist even if NATO should be dissolved.

The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, has been distinguished by much closer integration even in peacetime. The combination of ideological solidarity and the fear of invasion (which was confirmed in 1956 and 1968) represented an important element of bloc cohesion. This is why today, now that progress has been made in the disarmament process, non- communist governments have been allowed to make their appearance in some (and soon, possibly, in most) of the bloc countries, there has been a de facto renunciation of the "Brezhnev doctrine," and finally, now that the East European states' desire for greater autonomy, including military autonomy, is so strong, the Warsaw Pact is essentially losing its foundation.

Under these conditions, is there an alternative to the old model of cohesion or the disintegration of the socialist system? Of course there is. The restructured Warsaw

Pact and the reformed NATO, in my opinion, should secure the fundamentals and prerequisites of security based on mutual deterrence during a fairly lengthy transition period and in the near future. Furthermore, because this deterrence will be accompanied by arms control efforts, it will begin to acquire the characteristics of cooperation; the continuous process of negotiation and verification in the spirit of cooperation will most probably take place primarily on the level of the two alliances. Therefore, if deterrence and arms control should become their purpose instead of warfare, they will certainly turn into politico-military rather than military-political blocs. In that new situation, however, in that changed international atmosphere, there will be no excuse or desire to retain military organizations in their present form or any wish to keep military subunits in other countries (even on the level established at the third round of talks on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe). In the second place, the updated political functions will retain an internal relationship with the remaining military functions. They cannot divest themselves of the responsibility for intra-Western or intra-Eastern ties or respond to new European security challenges.

The many Soviet studies advising the reform of the Warsaw Pact seem to have encountered difficulties of this kind because they attempted to find answers to the same questions NATO had to face. The will and desire to find a new basis for what was previously the socialist community seem to exist. Presumably, this basis could be the voluntary recognition of the equal rights and mutual obligations of the parties, their existing common interests, and their interdependence, primarily in the economic sphere. The Warsaw Pact could be used as the institutional mechanism to attain this goal. I fully understand and fully support the first two points, but the last does not seem to be a good idea. Is a military (or former military) structure really the best instrument for the organization of economic cooperation? Could a military alliance which includes one of the superpowers be based on the genuine equality of its members, particularly in matters concerning strategy and the attainment of global goals? Could the organization responsible for the invasion of Prague in 1968 be the symbol of new political realities and rights?

The answer Soviet reformers propose seems to consist in copying some NATO structures: a headquarters outside the USSR, a political council, and a focus on global, non-military problems. It is precisely the sad experience of NATO, however, that should serve as a warning against noble illusions. As for military strategy and the use of conventional, not to mention nuclear, weapons, it is the United States that still has the deciding vote on the conceptual level and on the level of decisionmaking, despite the fact that such structures as the Nuclear Planning Group or the NATO Council are important advisory bodies. The situation is not likely to be any different in the Eastern bloc. Besides this, American efforts to extend NATO's influence to non- military spheres and non-European regions have never been successful. The existence of NATO's "third dimension," or its Economic Commission, was always illusory. Attempts to cope with economic problems arising between the community and the United States through NATO channels or to coordinate policy in the Third World by means of globalizing the bloc were always resisted by the West Europeans. They want to pursue their own policy and, in any case, they sense that the conclusion of agreements and coordination of actions with Washington should not be achieved through the channels of an organization the United States will always dominate by virtue of its inevitable strategic superiority. Within NATO itself, attempts to breathe life into the abstract idea of equality have been confined to the regrouping of its less influential members for the purpose of creating a European pillar to strengthen the internal balance, and not at all for the purpose of substituting this pillar for the alliance.

Can the Warsaw Pact afford to ignore this experience? The proposals of my friends Karaganov, Bezrukov, and Kortunov deserve approval because they reveal an understanding that Soviet ties with Eastern Europe should be based on states rather than parties, on common economic interests, and on respect for national independence rather than on ideological or military considerations. In Budapest or Warsaw, however, these proposals probably seem to focus too much on Moscow. On the institutional level, they could put the Warsaw Pact in the position of performing functions for which it is unsuited. On the political level, they underestimate the desire of East European countries (even if they still want to belong to the Warsaw Pact and recognize that they have economic interests in common with the Soviet Union) to achieve a more independent status, particularly the right not to submit to Warsaw Pact arbitration in domestic or inter-ethnic conflicts. Finally, although there is no solid foundation yet for an independent association of small and medium-sized East and Central European states, similar to the European Community, there is the possibility that relationships of this kind could be the only way of making cooperation by these countries with the USSR and with the West less inequitable in the more distant future.

In my opinion, this also provides some indication of future European security after the end of the transition period we are entering today. Although some of the military and diplomatic structures we have now (and a certain level of presence by Soviet and American troops and nuclear weapons) should be retained as guarantees of stability, the emphasis will shift toward economic, social, ethnic, and national problems.

To avoid a return to the model of international relations giving rise to two world wars, we should assign priority to the development of economic independence and democracy instead of the maintenance of a military balance, even at lower levels. In contrast to arms control, this kind of progress cannot be achieved within the framework of the two alliances. Although no one can or

should try to exclude the superpowers from this process, other relationships between the blocs and outside the blocs will acquire increasing significance. The European area, with a magnet as strong as the EEC, offers the possibility of various forms of unification with it. It is even possible that cooperative associations will come into being either within Eastern Europe or with other countries (such as, for example, the new type of cooperation by Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia). Another type of relationship, the pan-European, is the path of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—Ed.). A third factor is the activity of the United Nations, which could focus its peacemaking and mediating efforts in new situations of instability in Europe in order to reconcile the views of different parties and keep the peace, the kind of activity it has conducted only in developing countries to date.

I personally feel that the blocs will survive, but as their significance declines, the EC, the CSCE, and the United Nations will begin acquiring stronger influence and playing an important role. I think our intellectual efforts should be aimed mainly at developing a new mechanism of consultations and crisis management and at coping collectively with possible threats to peace and prosperity in Europe. This procedure should include all levels (bilateral or multilateral, pan-European or subregional) and areas (East-West or global). It will take flexibility to cope with the complexities of the new European system and the processes that are taking place on the continent.

All attempts to force new variables and contradictory realities into inherited organizational structures should be abandoned in favor of any form of cooperation, broad membership in different organizations, and the creation of overlapping groups and parallel institutions, which will frequently duplicate one another's functions.

On the Road to Confidence

914K0004E Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to press 26 Jul 90) pp 42-46

[Article by Lazar Izrailyevich Egenburg, chief aircraft designer]

[Text] The atmosphere of glasnost and openness in the Soviet society is affecting literally everything. Democratic changes are gradually dispelling the fog of absolute secrecy and excessive isolation in the defense industry as well. Some current events would have been simply unimaginable just a year ago.

The implementation of a new defensive doctrine has allowed the country to make real cuts in military expenditures. Information about defense allocations in the USSR and data on the number of tanks, airplanes, and helicopters (with a breakdown by classes) were published recently for the first time. Information was also published on the number of military personnel and the number of combat vehicles, aircraft, and other items subject to reduction. This February newspapers first published a diagram of the structure of the USSR Armed Forces and the names of military district, army, and navy commanders.

Significant changes are also taking place in the aviation industry, which was once as secretive as other defense branches. Models of combat planes and helicopters are now being demonstrated in the aerospace exhibits and air shows that are constantly being held abroad.

Today many people have remembered what Academician P.L. Kapitsa said about secrecy at the height of the "cold war." His views were published in the 1954 yearbook of the USSR Academy of Sciences and were then undeservedly forgotten.

Here are his postulates:

"1. A scientific achievement which is classified as a secret might as well not exist.

"2. The classified status is equivalent to muscles which have atrophied from disuse.

"3. Secrecy excludes the possibility of public oversight and promotes the development of pseudo-science, inaction, and bureaucratic regulation.

"4. Secrecy lowers the level of scientific work because people have less incentive to do the work well.

"5. Classification leads to nothing, because complete secrecy is essentially impossible. Secrecy hurts us more than it hurts our enemies.

"6. Secrecy creates a monopoly in scientific work and destroys health and competition.

"7. When our science and technology are genuinely advanced, they will not need to be kept secret."

The rules which P.L. Kapitsa formulated and which were revived by the new foreign policy apparently played a role in the decision to demonstrate models of Soviet combat planes in overseas exhibits in the same way that all other countries of the world have been doing for a long time.

The Soviet MIG-29 fighters made their debut at the Farnborough-88 exhibit. This was followed by the Le Bourget-89 exhibit, where Su-27 fighters and the Mi-28 helicopter were displayed. Soviet planes and helicopters were successfully demonstrated on the ground and in the air last August in the Canadian city of Abbotsford and in February 1990 at the fifth Asian aerospace show in Singapore.

Hundreds of thousands of spectators in England, France, Canada, and Singapore applauded the demonstration flights of the giant Mriya AN-225, the unprecedented acrobatic flying of the Su-27 and MIG-29 fighters, and

the stunts of the Malysha Su-26 sports plane and the Mi-28, Ka-126, and Ka-32 helicopters.

Furthermore, Australian and Singaporean air force commanders flew on the Su-27 fighter, and Canadian and American pilots flew the MIG-29.

New Soviet planes and helicopters were also shown to the Soviet people for the first time last summer in the air parade in Tushino and at Central Airport.

At the exhibit in Canada in fall 1989, the Americans, who were also taking part in the air show, invited Roman Taskayev, a test pilot from the MIG firm's experimental design bureau, to fly their F-4 Phantom fighter. It is true that the Phantom is a fairly old plane. It is no wonder that Taskayev joked that the Phantom cockpit reminded him of a cabin on a boat. Along with American Air Force Captain Bill Yorgens, Taskayev showed skill in flying the old Phantom, which is now part of the Aggressor squadron. The Soviet delegation responded the next day by inviting a Canadian military pilot, Air Force Major Wade, to join the Soviet pilot in the MIG-29UB two-seater. The 12-minute joint flight by Hero of the Soviet Union Valeriy Menitskiy, chief pilot of the MIG firm, and Bob Wade made news because Wade was the first Western pilot to fly a modern Soviet fighter plane.

Incidentally, two MIG's made a very long flight to take part in the Canadian air exhibit, taking off from an airfield in the Moscow suburbs and then flying from Novyy Urengoy to Tiksi-Anadyr to Anchorage (Alaska) to Vancouver (Canada). The one-seater MIG-29 was flown by A. Kvochur, who had made a name for himself at the air shows in Farnborough and Le Bourget. The two-seater MIG-29UB was flown by R. Taskayev and Aeroflot lead navigator A. Gorbatov.

American Eagle F-15C fighters met the MIG's at the border and escorted them to their base near Anchorage. These fighters are part of the 21st tactical air wing, based near Anchorage, the administrative center of the State of Alaska. After a 4-hour rest and a cordial reception, the Soviet planes took off again, escorted by the F-15's. There was a change of escort at the Canadian border. This time the planes were escorted by Canadian CF-18 fighters. They led the Soviet fighters to the airport near Vancouver, located almost on the southern border of Canada, where the air show was being held.

The members of the Soviet delegation and the maintenance crew flew to Vancouver in the Mriya AN-225, the biggest plane in the world, which was guided through American and Canadian air space by American air force navigators who were on board. The Su-26 sports plane and the Ka-32 helicopter were also on the AN-225.

The AN-225 landed on the Vancouver airfield in the evening of 6 August, followed by the MIG's, and demonstration flights were conducted successfully in the next few days. After the joint Soviet-Canadian flight on the MIG-29UB, chief designer A.A. Belosvet of the Experimental Design Bureau imeni A. Mikoyan told reporters: "We completed our part of the journey to the long contemplated joint flight on Soviet and Western fighter planes. The Canadian authorities did not agree at first with the idea, but the flight did eventually take place."

An article by the well-known correspondent Mark Rushton in the NEWS on 16 August 1989 aroused a great deal of interest in the joint flight. He wrote: "There was a genuine atmosphere of goodwill, in the literal and not the figurative sense of the word, on the airfield during those days. There was no hostility, fanaticism, or propaganda. The Russians did not seem to be enemies or oppressors. This is something everyone must realize if we want to put an end to the madness that might lead to worldwide holocaust."

He went on to say: "It is possible that this air show will not strengthen the international situation and will not send us skipping through a flower-filled meadow hand in hand, but I firmly believe that it will damned well undermine the situation in which people sit on different sides of the fence and exchange political and ideological insults." There is probably nothing we can add to the Western correspondent's observations, and we can only agree with his wishes.

The friendly relations in the military aviation sphere, which were forged in Farnborough in 1988 and were strengthened in Le Bourget and Vancouver, were then continued successfully in February 1990 at the fifth Asian international aerospace show in Singapore. Our Il-96-300, Su-27, and Su-26 planes and Ka-32 and Ka-126 helicopters were demonstrated there. Once again, there were displays of friendship and openness.

The improvement of relations between the superpowers is under way on different levels. At the end of 1989 a group of Soviet experts visited the United States as the guests of a university. The group included general designer R.A. Belyakov of the Experimental Design Bureau imeni A. Mikoyan and the chief pilot of the bureau V.Ye. Menitskiy. Here is what Hero of the Soviet Union and Honored Test Pilot Valeriy Menitskiy had to say about the visit: "A mutual wish for a joint flight on an F- 16 fighter was expressed during our tour of the General Dynamics plant. There did not seem to be any visible obstacles. The flight did not take place, however, because it was prohibited by the Pentagon or some other agency. In the opinion of American pilots, the perestroyka of the military bureaucratic machine is taking longer in the United States than in the USSR. Then we decided to take an American on a flight of our 'Spark' anyway (that is the name of the two-seater model of our combat fighter). Americans from the RAND company made the spiteful remark that all of our questions were being answered, while we were saying only what we were allowed to say. This is how our decades of secrecy and isolation have made them feel. The Americans have had just as much reason for suspicion as we have had in connection with this. Stereotypes of this kind have to be discarded not only by the top-level leadership, but also by the specialists whose opinions do much to determine

the awareness of the governments of both countries and the climate of international military-political relations."

Soon an opportunity did come up for a joint Soviet-American flight, but it was not in the United States or Canada. It took place in the USSR in December 1989. Two pilots, a Russian and an American, were in the cockpit of the combat training MIG-29UB. To the credit of our Ministry of Aviation Industry and military leadership, they did not object to the organization of this kind of flight. The Air Force Command of the Moscow District and the Air Force Garrison in Kubinka authorized the flight, in spite of the bad weather. Snow was falling, visibility was from 800 to 1,200 meters, and the cloud cover started at 100 meters above the ground and ended at an altitude of 9,000 meters. The plane cut through the air quickly. The snow-covered fields and dachas of the Moscow suburbs could be seen under the wing. Just a year ago this kind of flight would have been unimaginable, but the days of confrontation are receding quickly into the past, and our recent probable adversaries are becoming our partners and even our friends.

It is true that we can remember the United States and the USSR as allies in the coalition against Hitler 45 years ago. The American "flying fortresses," based in England, landed on an airfield near Poltava when they made their shuttle flights to Germany, and Soviet pilots fought the fascists on American Tomahawk and Air Cobra fighters and Boston and B-25 bombers. After World War II, however, American and Soviet pilots became potential and even actual adversaries. During the events in Korea (1950-1953), for example, they met in the sky as enemies. Those troubled and disturbing days are over, however, and the initiative of joint flights was taken. The first move was made, although it is true it was made in space, back in 1975, when the joint Soyuz-Apollo flight took place.

As 45-year-old Valeriy Menitskiy sat in the front seat of the MIG-29UB, an extraordinary guest seated himself in the back—46-year-old Doctor of Engineering Benjamin Lambeth, prominent expert in the planning of tactical aviation operations and RAND program director. Here is what he had to say about himself: "Just 3 years ago I was a rabid anti-Soviet. Now I am different. Of course, I am not a red or a Soviet. I am simply different. We are probably all a little smarter—the Russians and the Americans—now that we know each other better. Today I realized that we have taken the right road and that it would be disastrous to turn back."

It turned out that he was far from an ordinary pilot. He is a well- known scholar in his field and has flown 24 different kinds of fighter planes. It is interesting that the main purpose of his work in the RAND Corporation is to find an "antidote" to Soviet combat planes, including the MIG's.

He arrived in the USSR with three other American military experts from the RAND Corporation, who were invited to the USSR by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences. The Americans visited the Central Institute of Aerohydrodynamics imeni Zhukovskiy, the All-Union Institute of Systems Research, and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. They were most impressed, however, by their trips to the Kubinka airport and their meetings with Soviet frontline pilots.

"What was the purpose of this joint flight? Did the flight give the American expert on Soviet tactical aviation a deeper knowledge of our air battle weapons and tactics?" These are the questions a MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent asked V. Menitskiy. "We were flying without combat equipment, and I showed Lambeth only the maneuvers any pilot would know. Our MIG-29 has been exported for a long time and is quite familiar to foreign specialists. In short, there was no possibility of a leak of secret information," Menitskiy replied.

Perhaps, then, RAND had some kind of public relations interest? But RAND, which was founded in 1946, does not engage in any kind of commercial activity, and its name makes this clear—Research and Development. It is headed by a board of trustees, including three former U.S. secretaries of defense. The opposite also occurs: Schlesinger became secretary of defense after working for RAND.

In the sky over the Moscow suburbs, Menitskiy demonstrated some acrobatic maneuvers for Lambeth: rolls, 360-degree banked turns, low- speed loops, chandelles, climbing rolls, wingovers, and immelmans. The wingover at minimal speed and a steep slip angle was a complete surprise to Lambeth. The American later said that only sports planes could do this. It is beyond the capacity of the engines and control systems of any fighter. Any fighter but the MIG!

Just a little over a month later, on 30 January 1990, V. Menitskiy took another American, David North, on a ride in his Spark in Kubinka. This was also a pilot, although a former one. He fought in the war in Vietnam and logged more than 4,000 hours of flight time. Today North is the executive secretary on the editorial board of a well-known aviation magazine, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY. North was extremely impressed by the handling and performance of the MIG-29.

In the past RAND made a great effort to create an "enemy image" of the Soviet people and was successful. A Soviet journalist quipped in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA: "If RAND's impressions refute the earlier conclusions of American Sovietologists, it might not even be a bad idea to give them a ride on the Buran."

American-Soviet contacts are being revived between pilots and also between the designers and builders of aircraft. The press has already reported the intentions of the Soviet Design Bureau imeni P. Sukhoy and the American Piper firm to build a supersonic plane for business travel. These contacts can only be applauded,

particularly because they also have historical roots. At the end of the 1930s a license for the production of the DC-3 transport plane was purchased from the United States. It was produced for a fairly long time in the Soviet Union as the PS-84 or Li-2. The Catalina, the airliner of the Consolidated firm, was also built on a license. Today many people realize that cooperation on all levels reduces the danger of confrontation, and this is exactly what people all over the world want.

Chronicle of Soviet-American Relations (April-June 1990)

914K0004F Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to press 26 Jul 90) pp 122-127

[Text] April

2—Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze received representatives of the American Time company, headed by J. McManus.

3-6—E.A. Shevardnadze was in Washington on a working visit. His conversations with President G. Bush and Secretary of State J. Baker confirmed the mutual wish to use existing agreements as a basis for the successful completion of the efforts to draft an agreement on the radical reduction of strategic offensive arms after surmounting some lingering difficulties. The importance of consultations on European issues was underscored, particularly in light of the movement for German unity. During a discussion of the state of affairs at the Vienna talks, the Soviet side proposed the consideration of an alternative approach to the aviation question that might eliminate many of the present difficulties, namely the establishment of an equal ceiling for the combat planes of the USSR and the United States outside their national territory in Europe—500 units each, for example; other problems connected with aircraft could be carried over to the next phase of the talks. Positions on the issue of protocols to treaties on nuclear tests were finalized for the summit meeting. There was a productive discussion of transnational subject matter. It covered interaction in the United Nations, ecology, the Arctic, the Antarctic, outer space, the world ocean, the fight against international terrorism and the illegal drug trade, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. When the subject of Lithuania came up, G. Bush expressed the hope that the problem could be solved peacefully, by means of dialogue. An agreement was reached on the dates of President M.S. Gorbachev's trip to the United States.

4—The latest session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission to aid in the implementation of the provisions and goals of the USSR-U.S. agreements on strategic arms limitation and on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war began in Geneva.

9—The first visit to the USSR by a delegation of Alaskan businessmen came to an end after they had spent more than 2 weeks in our country as the guests of the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council.

10—A general agreement was signed in Moscow with the American PepsiCo Company on the construction of 26 new plants for the production of the popular beverage in the USSR before 2000, the modernization of old bottling lines, and the production of new beverages developed by American specialists.

11—Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet A.I. Lukyanov and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A.N. Yakovlev received an official delegation from the U.S. Senate, headed by Democratic Majority Leader G. Mitchell, who had been invited to the Soviet Union by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Eight policewomen from the United States arrived in Moscow as the guests of the USSR Union of Jurists as part of the "People to People" program.

12—E.A. Shevardnadze received the official U.S. Senate delegation headed by G. Mitchell in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

13—Former U.S. Senator Gary Hart, who was visiting the USSR, toured the PRAVDA editorial offices.

Anatoliy Grishchenko, the Soviet pilot who became seriously ill after taking part in emergency cleanup work on the damaged reactor of the Chernobyl AES, was flown to Seattle (Washington) for a bone marrow transplant.

15—Michael Boskin, chairman of the U.S. President's Council of Economic Advisers, was in Moscow for several days.

16—E.A. Shevardnadze received G. Hart at his request.

Members of the Presidential Council of the American National Association of Business and Professional Women (NABPW) had a meeting in Moscow with their Soviet colleagues—managers of Moscow enterprises and cooperatives. The Soviet Businesswomen's Association was founded at this meeting and will be headed by L. Konareva, senior scientific associate at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

18—Vice-President D. Quayle presented the USSR ambassador in the United States with the aerospace industry certificates of merit awarded to Soviet cosmonauts Vladimir Titov and Musa Manarov for setting a world record in space endurance. The Harmon Prize—one of the most prestigious awards—was established in 1926 in honor of famous aviator Clifford Harmon and is awarded for outstanding achievements in science and research.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev received President R. Fairbanks of the American National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation, who was visiting our country.

An English-language edition of IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS began to be issued in the United States. The publication, which is distributed on a subscription basis, contains translations of magazine articles and consists of two reviews—"Current Policy of the USSR" and "Political Archives of the USSR."

19, 25—Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh received U.S. Ambassador to the USSR J. Matlock. They discussed matters connected with the Soviet-U.S. talks on military policy.

20—"Glorie Dei Cantores" ("Singers of the Glory of God"), an American church choir, began a tour of our country.

23—A new round of trade talks between representatives of the USSR and the United States began in Paris. The granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union in trade with the United States was discussed.

24—A.A. Bessmertnykh received J. Giffen, a prominent American businessman and president of an American trade consortium.

A delegation of 250 people from the Georgian Republic arrived in Atlanta. A delegation from the State of Georgia set off for Tbilisi at the same time. The Americans from the State of Georgia will spend a month in the capital of the Georgian SSR, just as the Georgian guests in Atlanta will spend a month there. This is the largest exchange of delegations between the State of Georgia and the Georgian SSR and between the sister-cities of Atlanta and Tbilisi.

27—Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov had a meeting with IBM Vice-President M. Armstrong in the Kremlin.

28—Famous American public spokeswoman Pamela Harriman and prominent American researchers of Soviet-American relations R. Legvold, V. Hewitt, K. Shulman, D. Kipper, and S. Talbott were received by A.A. Bessmertnykh.

May

2, 10—A.A. Bessmertnykh received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock at his request.

3—Chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers K. Prunskene was in the United States on an unofficial visit.

4—A.A. Bessmertnykh received Executive Vice-President F. Neal of the American Committee on American-Soviet Relations.

The first Soviet-American production of "Swan Lake," organized by the leading choreographers of the Bolshoy Theater, the Leningrad Opera and Ballet Theater imeni S.M. Kirov, and the Boston Ballet Theater, was performed in Boston.

7—The American-Soviet Film Initiative, working in conjunction with the Playwrights' Guild of the USSR Union of Cinematographers and the American Screenwriters Guild, presented a film festival of American playwrights in our country. The 10 best American movies from the 1940s to the 1980s were shown for the first time.

R.M. Gorbacheva had a meeting with Pamela Harriman, who was in the USSR as a guest of the Soviet Peace Committee.

11—The Soviet border guard patrol ship "Volga" arrived in the Port of San Francisco. Along with naval ships and delegations from related services from other countries, it took part in celebrating the bicentennial of the U.S. Coast Guard.

15-19—American Secretary of State J. Baker came to Moscow for talks. The talks covered five main areas: arms control, regional issues, transnational issues, human rights, and bilateral relations. The main result of the talks was the elimination of unresolved issues pertaining to key provisions of the future treaty on the radical reduction of strategic offensive arms. Two main groups of problems were solved—problems connected with air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. A complex formula, which was acceptable to both sides, was elaborated for the ALCM. A politically binding declaration, outside the scope of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, will be adopted on the SLCM.

An agreement was reached on the obligations of the USSR and the United States to stop the production of chemical weapons and destroy these weapons before the international convention goes into effect. Finally, protocols to the treaties of 1974 and 1976 on nuclear tests were prepared for signature. Several regional issues were discussed, with Afghanistan prominent among them. A solid package of documents on economic, transnational, and bilateral issues was prepared for signature at the summit meeting: a trade agreement and agreements on grain deliveries and maritime transport, on the maritime border between the USSR and the United States, on studies of the world ocean, and on the cultural information centers to be opened in Moscow and Washington. The Soviet side asked the Americans to consider joint ecological observations from space, the establishment of a Soviet-American university, and other matters.

16—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy had a meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State R. Schifter.

17—V.F. Petrovskiy had a meeting with representatives from the American RAND Corporation and its president, J. Thompson.

A delegation from the Ohio State Arts Council was in Moscow. It hoped to conclude long-term agreements on cultural exchanges between the state, representing the American Midwest, and the Soviet Union, the development of contacts in the dramatic, fine, and commercial arts, and the organization of exhibits and festivals.

21-24—The 13th annual meeting of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council was held in Moscow.

A festival of American documentary films began in the USSR. The festival will go on for 6 weeks.

E.A. Shevardnadze received the heads of the organizing committee of the International Congress of Voters of the World Against Nuclear Weapons, Dr. B. Lawn (United States), USSR People's Deputy O.O. Suleymenov, and Academician M.I. Kuzin of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences. The prospects for the complete cessation of nuclear tests were discussed.

23—American public spokesman L. Bantle, chairman of the board of the U.S. Tobacco transnational corporation, was in the Soviet Union as the guest of the World Health Association of the Soviet Peace Committee.

24-27—The International Congress of Voters of the World Against Nuclear Weapons was held in Alma-Ata and was attended by more than 600 representatives from 30 countries. The congress was organized by Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War, an international organization, and the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Anti-Nuclear Movement.

25—The "Russian America" festival was held in the Moscow International Trade Center. The chief organizers were the Slavic- American Cultural Society on the American side and the Gratis advertising agency of the Soviet-American Cultural Initiative foundation on the Soviet side.

26—V.F. Petrovskiy received member of the U.S. House of Representatives D. Nagle, the Democratic congressman from the State of Iowa; he had a meeting with Director J. Mroz of the East-West Institute.

28—M.S. Gorbachev's TIME magazine interview was published.

30—A group of heavy Soviet planes took off from an airport in the Moscow suburbs to take part in an air show in Alaska.

31—The U.S. Library of Congress began exhibiting the books and manuscripts of Old Believers from the 15th century to the present day.

Chronicle of Summit Meeting of 30 May-5 June

30—President M.S. Gorbachev of the USSR arrived in the United States on a state visit.

31—Official talks were accompanied by M.S. Gorbachev's now traditional meetings with members of the U.S. scientific and business communities, cultural groups, and the public.

1—M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush signed the following documents in the White House: a trade agreement, an agreement on the elimination and non-production of chemical weapons, a protocol to the treaty on nuclear tests and a protocol to the treaty on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, an agreement on cooperation in the use of atomic energy, and an agreement on student exchanges.

Joint statements by the presidents were issued: on the basic provisions of the future treaty on the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms, on the next phase of strategic offensive arms talks, on the talks on conventional arms in Vienna, and on the Beringia international park.

The following agreements were signed on the ministerial level in the presence of the presidents: on the delineation of maritime borders, on world ocean research, on civil aviation, on shipping, and on grain.

In the USSR Embassy in Washington, the president of the USSR was awarded prizes and medals of influential American public organizations: The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Medal of Freedom, the Albert Einstein Peace Prize, the Historic Figure prize, the Martin Luther King International Peace Prize and the Martin Luther King 1991 Medal for a World Without Violence. A special American-Soviet "Gorbachev Student Exchange Program" was announced.

M.S. Gorbachev had a meeting with U.S. congressional leaders.

2—During their stay in the Camp David presidential retreat, M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush discussed a broad range of international security issues, primarily regional matters. The main topics were Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, India and Pakistan, and the Middle East.

3—The presidents of the USSR and the United States held a joint press conference in the White House before the departure from Washington.

Soviet-American agreements were signed in the State Department on the establishment of USSR and U.S. cultural information centers in Washington and Moscow, on customs cooperation, and on higher circulation figures for the magazines SOVIET LIFE and AMERIKA.

Members of the American business community and several Soviet ministers signed an agreement in the USSR Embassy on a joint venture with the Chevron Overseas Corporation for the exploitation of an oil and gas deposit in Kazakhstan. An agreement was also

reached on the delivery of 13,000 personal computers to Soviet schools in the next few years by the IBM Corporation.

3-5—M.S. Gorbachev visited Minneapolis (Minnesota), where he met members of the Midwestern business community and agroindustrial complex.

Security issues, confidence, partnership, and the profound reforms in the USSR were the main topics at M.S. Gorbachev's meeting in San Francisco with representatives of leading industrial, commercial, and financial companies and prominent West Coast politicians.

On his last day in America M.S. Gorbachev addressed faculty members and students at Stanford University.

June

3—The Radisson Hotels International company reached an agreement with Soviet Inturist on participation in equipping and operating a business cooperation center in Moscow.

The "Operation U.S.-USSR" program was drawn up. It will send Soviet and American physicians to developing countries to offer joint medical assistance.

4—A Soviet-American statement was published on necessary aid and the prospects for a political settlement of the internal conflict in Ethiopia.

5—American Professor Paul Deutsch, chairman of the board of the Paul Deutsch Press, arrived in Moscow. He signed a protocol of intent with VAAP, which proposes the publication of the works of pre-revolutionary and contemporary philosophers, social scientists, and pedagogues.

8—General Motors, the largest U.S. automotive corporation, signed a 5-year, 1 billion dollar contract with the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant in Tolyatti. The purpose of the contract is to make the products of this enterprise ecologically cleaner.

11—Eight American F-15 fighter planes took off from Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska to accompany two Soviet Su-27 fighter planes and the Mriya AN-225 airship to the fifth international aerospace show in Oklahoma City.

13—The USSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution on President M.S. Gorbachev's trips to the United States and Canada. It requested the USSR Council of Ministers and the appropriate ministries and departments to take the necessary measures for the timely and competent implementation of all the provisions of the signed Soviet-American and Soviet-Canadian agreements and other documents and statements.

A nuclear device of under 150 kilotons was exploded on a Nevada test range. This was the second nuclear test in the United States since the beginning of the year.

14—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister A.A. Obukhov received an American delegation, headed by T. Scully, chief of the maritime policy office of the U.S. State Department. American experts will hold consultations in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the interpretation and application of statements concerning navigation and maritime jurisdiction in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The Yale University Russian Men's Choir arrived for its traditional tour of our country. This is the choir's 12th trip to our country since it was established (in 1953).

17—The International Committee for the Release of Soviet Prisoners- of-War in Afghanistan, based in New York, and the Nadezhda People's Committee for the Release of Soviet Prisoners-of-War in Afghanistan reached an agreement to unite their efforts for the return of Soviet soldiers held prisoner by the mujaheddin.

18—A delegation of 200 Americans, including young politicians, businessmen, military experts, scholars, and cultural figures, attended the second set of gatherings of young leaders of the United States and USSR in various cities in the Soviet Union.

An exhibit of the intermediate-range nuclear missiles excluded from military arsenals—the American Pershing II and Soviet SS-20 missiles—was opened in the National Museum of Aeronautics and Space Research in Washington.

19—The first group of American tourists to visit Gorkiy, which no longer has the status of a closed city, arrived here on the "Sergey Yesenin."

21—The 10th session of the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Cooperation in Health Care completed its work in Washington.

21-27—The second meeting of Young Leaders of the USSR and United States, organized by the Komsomol, the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations, and the American International Leaders Center, was held in Dagomys in the Caucasus. The presidents of the USSR and the United States sent their greetings to the participants.

24—SOVIET TRADE NEWS is the name of a monthly magazine the Washington East-West publishing firm began publishing in the United States.

26—Ye.M. Primakov had a meeting with prominent Soviet and American political scientists attending a Soviet-American symposium on the causes of the cold war.

28—A.I. Lukyanov had a meeting in the Kremlin with a group of people who had attended the second meeting of young leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States in Dagomys.

An exhibit of "Medieval Masterpieces" from the Metropolitan Museum (New York) and Art Institute (Chicago) opened in the Pushkin State Fine Arts Museum.

29—The possibility of Soviet-American parliamentary cooperation was discussed when Chairman I.D. Laptev of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet met U.S. Assistant Secretary of State R. Schifter in Moscow.

America's Continental Airlines plans to begin regular passenger flights from Newark (New Jersey) to Moscow. The announcement was made at a press conference by a Continental spokesman at Newark International Airport.

Articles Not Translated

00000000 Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to press 26 Jul 90)

Publication Data

914K0004H Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to press 26 Jul 90) p 128

English title: USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

Russian title: SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Editor: A.V. Nikiforov

Publishing house: Izdatelstvo Nauka

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: August 1990

Signed to press: 26 July 90

Copies: 29,150

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